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Abstract 
Novelty and hysteresis are the main engines of economic evolution. However, they are 
also at the origin of co-ordination issues, as the consequences of any innovative 
choice can never be fully expected. Thus, there is no sense in analysing economic 
change as an intertemporal equilibrium with rational expectations. Not only growth 
and fluctuations cannot be dissociated, but there is no long-term trend that would be 
independent from what happens in the short- term. The explicit consideration of 
essential evolutionary phenomena like novelty and hysteresis help a clearer 
understanding of some important episodes of contemporaneous economic history. The 
periods considered are characterized by crises and structural changes, and it is 
exactly when important disturbances affect the functioning of the economies that the 
relevant features of their behaviour come to the surface and hence the right 
interpretations of the phenomena taking place, with the adequate policy implications, 
can be formulated.  
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INTRODUCTION 
While focussing on themes like technologies and institutions evolutionary economists 
have often abstracted from rigorous economic analysis. When this is not the case they 
have turned mainly to orthodox economic theory, especially when the latter has 
apparently considered the above-mentioned issues, but actually deprived them of their 
essence by casting them into its analytical mould. This has certainly obscured the 
comprehension of the problems of economic change that are at the heart of the 
working of capitalist economies. 
However, there are economists that have not fallen into this trap. Two of them need in 
particular to be mentioned, namely, John Richard Hicks and Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen, as they have been able to deal with typical evolutionary problems without 
giving up a rigorous analytical approach. 
We are both of us evolutionists, but not straight-line, or ‘exponential’ 
evolutionists. It is the new things that humanity has discovered which 
makes its history exciting; and the new things that may found in the 
future, before humanity blows itself up, or settles down to some ghastly 
‘equilibrium’, make a future worth praying for, and worth working for. 
(Hicks [1974], [1982] p. 300) 
 
These authors might be labelled as heterodox when considering what has become 
today the dominant economic theory. But this is certainly not the case when we 
consider that they actually walk in the threads of the great economists that have traced 
out the evolution in time of economic theory. What is then the reason why their 
contributions have been put aside, when not completely made to disappear? The 
reason, we believe, is the emergence of a way of doing theory that has ended up 
abstracting from essential evolutionary problems like novelty and hysteresis that are 
instead at the heart of these contributions. 
Modern economic analysis moves from the philosophic view that it is possible to 
clearly understand the functioning essentially rational of the world, and hence 
establish an order (of economic behaviours and institutions) as the result of this 
understanding. However, this view abstracts actually from phenomena like the 
emergence of novelties and the process of hysteresis, which imply that « however 
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large the number of observations, the effect of the last experiment can be known only 
after we observe what we wish to predict » (Georgescu-Roegen [1971] p. 126). 
This consideration blurs the very method of contemporaneous 
@causality that is at the heart of the ‘equilibrium’ analytical 
framework: a method which allows to define a state of the economy as 
its natural way of being and functioning and that implies that a certain 
effect is automatically associated with a given signal (e.g., a greater 
revenue implies more consumption, higher costs imply higher 
prices…) 
The natural reference of novelty and hysteresis to change and processes taking place 
step by step shifts in fact the focus from the logical time of the world of equilibrium 
states, an arbitrary accounting period whose length is not relevant, to the historical 
time, where different evolutions of the economy are possible. In the latter context, in 
particular, inputs are dissociated in time from outputs and costs from proceeds, thus 
casting heavy doubts on standard production and consumption theories.  But, as we 
shall see in the next pages, other consequences follow from the consideration of 
novelty and hysteresis.  The distinction between a ‘positive’ and a ‘normative’ 
approach takes on a different meaning. The co-ordination of economic activity, 
assured by assumption in an equilibrium context, becomes the crucial problem to be 
solved for the viability of the economies.  Money can no longer be considered as 
neutral as it appears as a main actor of the co-ordination process. The very distinction 
between short and long term fades away, as the last appears just as the result of a 
related sequence of short terms, as well as the distinction between growth and 
fluctuations, where the latter become just the way of being of the former.  
THEORY AND NOVELTY 
It is for its dogmatism, not for its use of abstraction that standard 
economics is open to valid criticism. Casual observation of what 
happens in the sphere of economic organizations, or between 
these organizations and individuals, suffices to reveal phenomena 
that do not consist of tâtonnement with given means towards 
given ends according to given rules. They show beyond any 
doubt that in all societies the typical individual continually 
pursues also an end ignored by the standard framework: the 
increase of what he can claim as his income according to his 
current position and distribution norms. It is the pursuit of this 
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end that makes the individual a true agent of the economic 
process. 
Two are the methods by which he can pursue this particular end. 
First, he may seek ways by which to improve qualitatively the 
means he already possesses. Secondly, he may seek to increase 
his personal share of the stock or flow of social means, which is 
tantamount to changing the prevailing distributive relations. It is 
because even in a socialist society the individual activity is in the 
long run directed towards these aims that new means are 
continually invented, new economic want created, and new 
distributive rules introduced. (Georgescu-Roegen [1966] p. 105, 
[1971] p. 320). 
 
Thus the economic discipline, traditionally aimed at analyzing how given economic 
means can better pursue given economic ends, and what this implies in terms of the 
distribution of income and wealth, ought rather focus on the process by which new 
economic means are created in order to pursue new economic ends: it is in fact the 
emergence of novelty that actually determines the history both of individuals and the 
society. The reason is that “evolutionary elements predominate in every concrete 
economic phenomenon of some significance” (Georgescu-Roegen [1971] p. 320). 
The novelty we are talking about is not a simple projection towards a future rationally 
anticipated moving from current data, though. It is instead the effect of the experience 
accumulated along the way: the effect of the hysteresis. 
As a matter of fact, contrary to what the standard economic theory purports, the 
economic process is not a mechanical phenomenon, and as such it cannot be defined 
by the laws that make its variables to depend on a time measured by a mechanical 
watch. 
The idea that the march of the entire economic process can be 
described by a system of differential equations with clock-time as 
the independent variable – an idea underlying many macro-dynamic 
models – is in all probability vitiated ab ovo. (Georgescu-Roegen 
[1971] p. 139). 
 
Novelty, according to Georgescu-Roegen, has a precise meaning. It means that the 
economic process cannot be fully determined by its initial conditions or, let alone, by 
rationally anticipated future conditions. What happens along the way, the learning, the 
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articulation step by step of decisions and arising constraints, actually determines the 
evolution of the economy. The hysteresis cannot be dissociated from the novelty. 
Novelty, on the other hand, is what allows to clearly understanding the difference 
between the concept of risk and that of uncertainty, introduced by Knight and 
elaborated by Keynes. While a risk is associated with a state characterized by a 
certain probability, the result of uncertainty is a radically new situation.  While a 
result associated with a certain probability can be a reference to rely upon, the 
surprise deriving from novelty cannot be dealt with ex-ante but must be taken care of 
step by step.   
The point bears upon Shackle’s original idea ([1949], [1955]) of 
analyzing expectations in terms of the degree of surprise caused by 
their realization instead of the degree of belief in their outcome. In one 
respect the idea has a definite merit. While the occurrence of any event 
for which there is an ex ante degree of belief will cause a degree of 
surprise (the greater the smaller is the degree of belief), for a truly 
novel event there is an ex post surprise but no ex ante belief in it. 
(Georgescu-Roegen [1971] p. 123). 
 
In this light, growth appears as a quantitative phenomenon distinct from development 
interpreted as a qualitative change. 
In the literature, we (…) find the right starting point for a physiological 
analysis of economic change. It is a distinction upon which 
Schumpeter, with his characteristic flair for what is analytically 
relevant, repeatedly insisted. The idea is that any economic change 
consists of entirely distinct types of phenomena – growth and 
development. As Schumpeter defined it, development consists of a 
‘spontaneous and discontinuous’ change that comes from within the 
economic process because of the very nature of that process. This 
change consists of some entirely new ways of combining the 
productive forces and materials, briefly, of new methods of production. 
Such a novelty changes the face of economic world forever, that is, in 
an irreversible and irrevocable manner (Georgescu-Roegen [1974], 
[1976] p. 243). 
 
While it is always possible to define and measure growth by a quantitative index, it is 
the continuous emergence of novelty that determines the effective evolution of market 
capitalist economies.  
NOVELTY AND CAUSALITY 
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The essence of modern economic analysis is to define causal relations, which is not 
possible singling out as those actually leading to given observed facts. And « with a 
bewildering variety of possible models to choose from, one can reasonably ask what 
could constitute the verification or the falsification of a particular model » (F. Fisher 
[1991] p. 211). The test of the relevance of a particular theory is then that « one can 
use it to tell a logical consistent story of what might have happened – a story 
consistent with the few facts that the theorist happens to know » (ibid.). 
Contrary to this approach, the focus on qualitative changes, at all unforeseeable, does 
not allow referring to a given logical frame from which all sorts of propositions could 
be deduced and hence figuring out laws of evolution functions of clock-time.   
This is why economics cannot be considered as a theoretical science (Georgescu-
Roegen ([1966], [1971]). It is a discipline (Hicks [1983]). Its fundamental principles 
derive from the institutional setting. “Without this institutional content, the principles 
are nothing but ‘empty boxes’, from which we can only obtain empty generalities” 
(Georgescu-Roegen [1971] p. 324). In other words, there are not economic laws that 
only the existence of institutional imperfections hampers from being fully applicable. 
Outside a specific institutional content  - and, we would add, without reference to the 
specific features that the economic phenomena each time considered take up in this 
context – the application of these laws is not only senseless but, as we shall see, also a 
threat to the viability of the economies and the societies concerned. 
Laws of supposed general validity, where the variables involved are a function of 
clock-time, are based on a particular notion of causality: the contemporaneous 
causality as opposed to the sequential causality (Hicks [1979]). 
Contemporaneous causality is the relation that characterizes the equilibrium analytical 
models, including intertemporal models: that is, models referred to economies which 
function in an established way. It comes directly from the relation between economic 
magnitudes that classical economists figured out to replicate the general and 
immutable character of the ‘ laws’ of physics and other sciences 
Adam Smith (…) is saying that the relative cheapness of water 
transport is a cause of the relative wealth of some places that have 
good water communications. He is thus (in terms of our analysis of 
causality) comparing what was in his time with what would have 
been if, other things being equal, the relative costs of land and water 
carriage had ben different. He must thus be thought of as 
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constructing a theoretical model, in which relative costs are changed 
but other things are not changed. What was in time is what was in 
his lifetime, or over the time his memory extends – quite a long 
period. The model must refer to the same period. But since it is only 
the things which in actual experience remain, more or less, 
unchanged over time which are relevant to the comparison, it would 
seen to follow that the model itself must be unchanging. Change 
over time, within its period, cannot enter into it, since such change 
is irrelevant to it. That is the first sense in which the model must be 
in equilibrium. (Hicks [1979] p. 45) 
 
Such causality implies that it is always possible to deduce a given effect from a 
certain cause, so that they become analytically contemporaneous. This doesn’t mean 
not to make reference to time but that in the perspective adopted the time dimension is 
not relevant. In this perspective in fact, with reference to the phenomenon of 
production, although differently dated, inputs do not come before output 'in an 
essential way'. That is, they are analytically, and from an accounting viewpoint, 
contemporaneous, in the sense that there are always proceeds against which costs can 
be set and a 'current' productive activity out of which they can be financed. 
Sequential causality implies instead that a given effect is dissociated in time from a 
certain cause 'in an essential way', in the sense that it may or may not result from it 
according to what happens during the lapse of time between the two. It is the causal 
relation that characterizes evolutionary and sequential models, which are aimed at 
analysing the evolution of economies out of equilibrium, that is, while undergoing a 
process of change. 
In the world of contemporaneous causality constant laws determine the relations 
between the events. An increase in income implies a greater consumption. Higher 
costs bring about higher prices. A given effect is always associated to a certain signal, 
with reference to a time that is an arbitrary accounting period whose length is not 
relevant. 
Sequential causality, on the contrary, denies the existence of constant, reliable laws. 
Multiple and possibly different evolutions of the economies may come about 
depending on what happens along the way, namely, depending on the sequence of the 
decisions taken step by step, and the sequence of the constraints deriving from them. 
Mario Amendola and Jean-Luc Gaffard 
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These decisions appear then as the heritance of the past and the determinants of the 
future.  
The time lags are essential in this sketching out of the evolution of the economy: the 
prior lag, which is the lag between the signals coming from the market, or the 
authorities, and the decisions taken as a result; the posterior lag, which is the lag 
between these decisions and their realization. These lags may be very different,.  In 
particular, the prior lag is tricky. “For the objective cause does not necessarily compel 
a reaction; it is (as often been said) a ‘signal’, and the reaction to the signal may be 
fast or slow” (Hicks [1979] p. 90). Higher incomes do not necessarily imply a greater 
consumption, both because consumers wait to know more about the reliability of the 
signal received and because the goods that they would like to demand in greater 
quantities are not disposable at the moment. Higher costs may not mean higher prices, 
because before increasing their prices the producers could prefer to see what the 
competitors would do or because they are bound by long-term contracts with their 
clients and prefer to reduce their profit margins rather than risk to loose market 
shares. Reserves become an important ingredient of the decision process. 
The absence of reserves, either in the form of liquid assets or of 
assured borrowing power, is a severe constraint on freedom; it must 
therefore be expected that the decision-maker will seek to remove it, 
if that can be done at reasonable sacrifice, so far as he can. So the 
characteristic form of a modern economy is one in which many of 
those who make decisions have some reserves. They are accordingly 
not bound to respond to the signals; even if the signal persists, they 
have time to react. So the signal is less imperative, and therefore 
less dependable. (Hicks [1979] p. 91) 
Thus, stocks may act as buffers between physical inflows and outflows, and between 
financial income and expenditure flows (Leijonhufvud [1973]). In particular, stocks of 
liquid assets allow expenditures to be maintained when revenues fall off. Thus real 
world economies could be more robust than pure flow models would suggest. 
However, if disturbances are of an unanticipedly large magnitude, buffer stocks may 
be exhausted and a tight income constraint takes over.  
Moreover, the role of real and financial stocks is ambivalent. On one hand, they may 
effectively act as buffers. On the other hand, they may reinforce the multiplier effect. 
Debts may act as buffers as well as they may amplify demand constraints. Thus, 
deflation increases the real value of existing debt, and the price effects may 
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themselves be deviation amplifying. An increasing indebtedness of households, which 
may hide, for a while, the effects on output of large displacements of potential 
demand, will end by affecting current spending, when it appears that these households 
are insolvent. 
Clearly, given technologies and/or preferences cannot univocally determine 
production and consumption paths, and hence the evolution of the economy, as 
standard economic models purport. 
PRODUCTION 
Production is a matter of organization rather than of technology. The commonplace 
representation of this phenomenon can be relied upon only in the particular contexts 
of general equilibrium or steady growth. In these contexts the production function is 
defined as the frontier of the set of possible productive combinations. This definition 
results from an efficiency axiom. The representation of production is in fact fully 
assimilated to the economic problem that it evokes, that is, the choice of the optimal 
allocation of productive resources. Production appears as a pure technical 
phenomenon; neither its time dimension nor its organizational one is taken into 
account. 
The real story is a different one (Georgescu-Roegen [1971], [1976]).  The production 
process is characterized not only by its inputs and outputs but also by the length of 
time over which it extends. The inputs and the outputs themselves are defined over 
time. According to Georgescu-Roegen, the elements that characterise an elementary 
production process are better divided into two categories: the flow elements (natural 
resources, intermediary products) that enter or leave the process (they are destroyed 
or created), and the funds elements (equipment, machines, human capital) that enter 
and leave the process. The main problem, in relation to any given elementary process 
is that the fund factors involved in may remain idle during a great part of the 
production time. When prevailing, this idleness prevents from investing in fund 
factors and taking advantage of a further division of labour, which slows down 
growth. Efficiency requires a specific arrangement of a number of elementary 
production processes, which is the way to reduce the idleness of fund factors. Thus, 
the industrial organization of production processes that consists in arranging 
production stages in such a way that all stages are simultaneously carried out 
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(production in line) allows to minimize the idleness of equipment, thus being the 
source of static efficiency. Introducing this organisational dimension in the analysis of 
production prevents from considering the production phenomenon as a purely 
technical one as it is the case with the production function.  
 The standard production function, in which any reference to the time dimension of 
the production process vanishes, is only relevant in the particular context of a 
complete synchronisation of the different stages of production. This, however, 
requires a large scale of production and hence a corresponding size of final demand. 
Only then the supply and demand conditions are met, costs and revenues are 
synchronised and labour productivity can be considered as reflecting the properties of 
technology. But this state is only a benchmark, which corresponds to a specific 
organisation of production and that calls for a specific institutional context.  
One might maintain that this is the case of market capitalist economies. But it is not 
so. In the attempt to assure the maximum efficiency in the use of existing resources, 
which is never fully satisfied, the industrial organization continuously creates 
incentives to innovate, thus reducing static efficiency in order to promote dynamic 
efficiency.      
What actually happens, then, is that inputs are dissociated from outputs and costs 
from receipts. These distortions are transmitted over time making the evolution of the 
economy to depend on what happens step by step. 
Let us consider, for example, the case of a major innovation characterized by the fact 
that the construction cost of a new productive capacity exceeds the replacement cost 
of the existing one, more than counterbalanced, of course, by a reduction of its 
utilization cost and an increase of its efficiency (Hicks [1973]). With given resources, 
the investment measured in units of productive capacity is reduced due to the increase 
in the unit construction cost. If wages are fixed, at the end of the construction period 
of the new productive capacity there will be a lower productive capacity in general, 
which will result in a fall of gross output and then in unemployment. This, we may 
recall, is the case of Ricardo’s machinery effect (Ricardo [1951]), which shows how 
the unemployment resulting from technical progress is not due to the specific features 
of the new technology introduced, superior by definition, but to the economic 
conditions of the transition process from the old to the new technology. With flexible 
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wages, and full employment, the increase in construction costs will nevertheless bring 
about a fall of gross output, associated now with a fall in labour productivity, which 
will no longer measure the efficiency of the technology but the difficulties of the 
transition.   
Thus, while in a state of equilibrium the productivity of labour reflects that of the 
technology, under the axiom of efficiency, out of equilibrium it is dissociated from 
the latter and reflects rather the economic conditions of the transition between 
technologies, which depend mainly on the prevailing institutions.    
CONSUMPTION DECISIONS    
In the same way as production, consumption has a time dimension, which we cannot 
abstract from.  As a matter of fact consumers’ choices cannot be analysed simply by 
assuming that they obey axioms establishing the coherence of preferences, without 
taking into consideration the existence of effects of hysteresis.    
The indifference map (the order of preferences) of the consumer changes when he 
experiments a combination of goods that does not belong to the combinations set 
already experimented in the past. It changes a fortiori when a new good is introduced. 
When his income goes up the consumer does not increase his consumption of all the 
existing goods in the same proportion: he extends his demand to a greater gamut of 
goods so as to satisfy new needs.  
Preferences are not homothetic, which reveals an essential dimension of evolution.  
According to this model, at a given position (M1), the consumer has 
a definite demand (D1) for X. if a change in price brings him to a 
new position (M2) capable of altering his indifference map, his 
demand for X will implicitly be changed in a new curve (D2). Save 
for a irrelevant coincidence, no new shift in prices alone could bring 
the consumer back to the former position (M1). This irreversibility 
(…) appears with this model to be the normal case, whereas 
reversibility is the exceptional one Georgescu-Roegen [1950], 
[1966] p.179). 
 
And the fact that new experiences may push consumers to change their preferences 
hampers from calculating a general equilibrium assuring an optimal allocation of 
resources.  A ‘demon of Laplace’  could not be able to do it because any answer given 
to him ex ante could reveal itself wrong ex post.            
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The equilibrium computed by our demon is (…) defeated not by 
interventions of exogenous factors but by endogenous causes. 
Consequently, our demon will have to keep on recomputing running 
away equilibria, unless by chance he possesses a divine mind 
capable of writing the whole history of the world before it actually 
happens. But then it would not longer to be a ‘scientific’ demon. 
(Georgescu-Roegen [1966] p. 119).  
 
The phenomenon of hysteresis and the complementarity of successive utilities 
hampers the consumers from establishing an optimal level of savings and thus to 
maximize an intertemporal utility. Two hypotheses underlying this kind of 
calculation, in fact, are not verified: the hypothesis of stationarity of the intertemporal 
preferences and the hypothesis of independence of successive utilities implying that 
the utility function has the shape of a sum of separate utilities (Hicks [1965] pp.251-
63). 
Not being able to compare all possible alternatives, the consumer makes his choices 
each time comparing the utility of the good he intends to buy with the marginal utility 
of money as resulting from past experience. This solution, suggested by Marshall, is 
only valid in an essentially stable environment. 
But when income is changing (or when many prices are changing) it 
becomes less reliable. It is based on the past; when the present is 
seriously unlike the past, it becomes a less reliable guide. The lags with 
which consumption responds to a change in real income, though they 
are partly a matter of constraints set by commitments (including as 
commitments the possession of durable goods), must also be a matter 
of the time which is taken for the marginal utility of money, as it 
appears to the consumer, to respond to change. To make fully rational 
decisions in fundamentally new conditions is by no mean easy (Hicks 
[1976], [1982] p. 286). 
 
Novelty and hysteresis cast heavy doubts on the axioms on which the standard theory 
of the preferences is based. The choice made according to the latter are in fact no 
longer coherent once strong variations affect individual incomes and/or the structure 
and the level of prices.   
NORMATIVE ECONOMICS AND POSITIVE ECONOMICS 
The models of modern economic theory belong to the normative ‘welfare economics’ 
– whose task is exactly to define a measure of the welfare and to establish the 
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conditions of its maximization – rather than to positive economics. This branch of 
economic analysis is aimed in particular at identifying an equilibrium describing the 
position of the economy at all times 
The equilibrium assumption is included in the way the theory is set up. 
This is certainly so if we define our social optimum by some sort of 
‘social welfare function’; for if we do that, we are treating the economy 
as if it consisted of a single ‘individual’; it is the equilibrium choice of 
that single chooser which is the optimum choice. And the position does 
not seem to be radically different if we insist on pluralism, as for 
instance when we ‘reconcile’ the maximisation of utility by ‘distinct’ 
individuals by compensation devices, so long as the maximisation of 
utility by each individual is kept as one of the conditions of 
optimization. A static welfare optimum has to be an equilibrium (Hicks 
[1985] p. 13). 
 
Focussing on a point or a path of equilibrium determined by the optimizing behaviour 
of a representative agent exempts from investigating the stability of this equilibrium, 
that is, the convergence towards it starting from a given disequilibrium state, since in 
the perspective adopted, the economy is by definition in equilibrium in each point of 
the trajectory followed: an equilibrium that corresponds to an individual optimum. 
The facts that are observed are supposed to be the result of this behaviour. The 
evolution of the economy can be regular, or undergo fluctuations when the consumer 
reacts to exogenous stochastic shocks, as is the case with the real business cycles 
theory. 
In positive economics, on the contrary, the equilibrium point or path is a particular 
position of the economy which may be attained or less starting from a given 
disequilibrium position. 
It is necessary, if the equilibrium assumption is to be justified, that we 
should be able to assert the existence of a tendency to equilibrium; and 
indeed, if the assumption is to be usable, it must be a strong tendency. 
(Hicks [1985] p. 13).  
This distinction between normative economics and positive economics fosters 
thinking about the very notion of equilibrium and its use in economic analysis. 
Equilibrium is about the rationality of economic agents (any one acts so as to attain 
his preferred position), the consistency of their actions, the compliance of their 
perceptions of the environment with its reality. Thus “an economy is in equilibrium 
when it generates messages which do not cause agents to change the theories which 
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they hold or the policies which they pursue” (Hahn [1973] p. 2). This is true of static 
equilibrium, of long run equilibrium, of intertemporal equilibrium; although the 
reference to intertemporal equilibrium radically modifies the nature of the concept of 
equilibrium, which is no longer an attractor – a stationary point (Dos Santos Ferreira 
[1989]). 
The evolution of an economy is the result of what happens in a sequence of moments, 
along which the economy may be or may be not in equilibrium. The equilibrium at a 
given moment of time points to a rational behaviour. Every agent acts so as to reach a 
certain end given the constraints inherited from the past and the expectations as the 
future events. The absence of equilibrium over the whole sequence of moments means 
that the expectations have not come true, that some wrong decisions have been taken 
that cannot be instantaneously, and without cost, reversed. This is fossilized in the 
formation of non-desired stocks, whether real and/or monetary. At each moment new 
constraints emerge, and new opportunities appear whose exploration feeds a learning 
process. The economy sends messages that cause agents to change their perception of 
the environment. It is clear that such a kind of sequence has nothing to do with an 
intertemporal equilibrium. 
In this light norms no longer obey axiomatic principles. They rather reflect behaviours 
or attitudes in relation to given events, having a contingent character and changing 
with the events themselves. They are the result of rules and institutions that evolve 
with the experience, as well as of political choices that reflect the pressure of lobbies 
or arbitrates that reconcile conflicting interests. 
The aim that these norms pursue is no longer the definition of a social optimum, but 
the viability of the economy confronted with the distortion that its evolution 
necessarily implies. The relations between the economic agents  – the social 
interactions – prevail over their individual utility functions (Coase [1978]). The 
construction of a viable interaction shapes the behaviours of the agents rather than the 
research of a maximal utility for each individual. 
CO-ORDINATION PROBLEMS 
The emergence of novelty brings about co-ordination problems typical of an economy 
out of equilibrium, different from the co-ordination problems arising from the 
Novelty, hysteresis, and growth 
	
	 15
existence of multiple equilibria. In the first case the very viability of the economy is in 
doubt, while in the second case the only problem is the sub-optimality of the 
equilibrium chosen. The discussion on the relevance of endogenous growth models 
throws light on the point   
Endogenous growth theory as it now exists is not well suited for 
dealing with the deepest adjustment and co-ordination problems raised 
by technological change, because the general equilibrium framework in 
which it has been cast assumes away all problems of disequilibrium co-
ordination. Not all endogenous growth models are Walrasian 
competitive equilibrium models, but they are all rational expectations 
equilibrium models, and the assumption of rational expectations 
equilibrium implies either that people have no need to adjust to each 
other as in many representative agents models, or that they have 
already been provided, by some unspecified mechanism, with a pre-
coordinated set of beliefs on which to base their actions. (Howitt 
[1994] p. 772). 
 
Out-of-equilibrium co-ordination problems were already at the heart of Harrod’s 
growth model [1939], whose principal aim, blurred in its standard interpretation, was 
to understand what happens when the current growth rate does not allow realizing the 
entrepreneurs’ production and investment plans.  When the actual capital stock differs 
from the desired one, an adjustment is required to take care of a disequilibrium that 
reflects a lack of co-ordination. The evolution of the economy will then be determined 
by this adjustment rather than by the properties of the production function. The result, 
according to Harrod, will then be a global instability. The fact that this result does not 
seem to go along with the observed facts has been generally imputed to the hypothesis 
of fixed coefficients of the production function, although in Harrod’ model there is 
not a production function but an investment function, which is a behavioural function 
and not a technical one. Besides, the global instability is just one possible result out of 
many others. If, while considering an investment function, adjusting the effective 
capital stock to the desired one is a long and gradual process, the economy actually 
remains near an equilibrium path (Hahn et Matthews [1964]). 
Whatever the shortcoming of Harrod’ model, though, it remains the necessity of the 
representation of a growth process taking place in real time and stirred by innovation, 
in order to be able to single out the co-ordination problems arising out of equilibrium. 
This is what Hicks’ model of the Traverse [1973] takes care of. In this model the 
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Austrian inspired articulation of the production process in real time allows to show 
the distortion of productive capacity  - the fact that its construction phase is no longer 
consistent in time with its utilization phase – due to the introduction of an innovation, 
which implies the breaking of a regular growth process and the emergence of 
unemployment.  True, in the specific analysis carried out by the author, an ad hoc 
hypothesis, that of full performance of the economy, allows a continuous matching of 
supply and demand and the necessary arrival to a new equilibrium where 
unemployment is fully reabsorbed, thus reducing the Traverse to a predetermined 
mechanical trajectory, as stressed by Solow. 
The Austrian scheme is well adapted to the mechanical job of tracing 
out the route by which the new process replaces the old. It is possible 
to keep track of employment as old processes die off and new ones 
start. But that accounting does not take us very far (…) Professor Hicks 
is an illustrious addition to the ranks of those who have not go very far 
with non-steady state capital theory, even though he has some new 
things to say. The problem is, of course, terribly difficult. There may 
very well not be any general theorems to prove; even the qualitative 
results may depend sensitively on precise assumptions about the 
formation of expectations, the character of technological possibilities, 
the sociology and social institutions of business decision-making, the 
volume and composition of effective demand. (Solow [1974] p. 191).  
 
However, this drawback hides the thorough analytical advance that this model 
implies. As a matter of fact the question is not to know whether it provides an 
analytical framework able to deal properly with all the features of qualitative changes. 
But whether it deals properly with one essential dimension of changes characterized 
by the phenomena of novelty and hysteresis. The crucial point, here, is that 
unemployment is not the consequence of the specific proprieties of the new 
technology, but rather a feature of the very process of change: as a matter of fact the 
result of the sequential interaction of decisions and constraints sketching out this 
process. The simplifying hypothesis adopted by Hicks, which amounts to make 
specific reference to a perfect barter economy, doesn’t actually affect the basic 
structure of the model. The effects of a distortion of productive capacity on 
productivity and employment that the model allows to show emerge in all 
circumstances and not only in the case of a perfect barter economy.  Moreover, the 
introduction of money into the model allows enriching considerably the understanding 
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of the essential features and of the viability conditions of processes of structural 
economic change. 
THE MONETARY LINK 
As just mentioned, Hicks [1973] has pointed out that fluctuations are possible in a 
barter economy as the effect of real distortions that affect the profile of production 
processes, even if full performance is assumed. In a monetary economy, when 
uncertainty results in a lack of coordination between supply and demand, these 
fluctuations can be amplified or dampened according to the role played by money and 
finance.  
The introduction of money allows acquiring and diffusing the information, without 
which the exchanges wouldn’t take place. With its coordination role it shapes the 
evolution of the economy out of equilibrium, and as such may make it viable, 
avoiding the danger of its collapse. The corollary is, of course, that there is not an 
attractor determined by technology or the preferences from which the economy 
cannot definitely deviate. 
More specifically, innovation that implies diverting some resources from old to new 
uses, or simply an acceleration of growth, requires money creation.  
Let us suppose that Industry seeks to expand production (…) Inputs 
come before outputs, so the first requirement is for additional money 
to pay for the inputs; and if the higher level of production is to be 
maintained, the money will need to be kept within the industrial 
sector, to circulate the increased output. ((Hicks [1979] pp. 97-8) 
 
Monetary theory should then be conceived in a way that permits to identify how the 
financial sector interacts with the real sector in an economy out of equilibrium. It has 
instead most often been looked at as a portfolio choice, aimed at arbitrating between 
risk and revenue in the case of different possible events. In this kind of analysis the 
essence of the concept of liquidity, the most important attribute of money, disappears. 
For liquidity is not a property of single choice; it is a matter of a 
sequence of choices, a related sequence. It is concerned with the 
passage from the known to the unknown – with the knowledge that if 
we wait we can have more knowledge. So it is not sufficient, in 
liquidity theory, to make a single dichotomy between the known and 
the unknown. There is a further category, of things, which are 
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unknown now, but will become known in time. These also must be 
fitted in (Hicks [1974] p. 38-9). 
This definition of liquidity, that confers to money its specific attribute, points to the 
interest of economic agents to know whether today’s choice implies or less a greater 
gamut of future choices. Liquidity, then, is what is provided by the acquisition of 
“assets more certainly realizable (that is, convertible into money) at short notice 
without loss” (Keynes, The Treatise Vol II,p.67) 
A firm, which acquires a non-marketable asset – say a new factory, 
designed and equipped from its own particular purpose – has 
committed itself to a course of action, extending over a considerable 
time, which a fairly narrow band of subsequent choices attached to it. It 
has ‘given hostages of fortune’. The acquisition of an easily marketable 
asset, on the other hand, can easily be revoked. There is not the same 
diminution of liquidity; the firm is in position that is almost as flexible, 
after the acquisition, as before it. That, I suggest, is precisely what we 
mean by saying that the marketable asset possesses liquidity. (Hicks 
[1974] p. 41-2). 
 
What just stressed clearly implies that the traditional portfolio choice theory is 
relevant only in the case of a choice made once and for all or in the case in which 
there are not investment and/or disinvestment costs. This may be the case when 
financial investments are dissociated from the real economy, and investors abstract 
from the consideration of the passing of time; but certainly not in the case of 
innovation. In this case, the entrepreneurs have to make choices, whether concerning 
physical or financial assets, that take into account the consequences of their 
irreversibility.  
These assets may, however, be cross-classified in what for our present 
purpose is a more meaningful way. First there are assets which are 
required for the normal running of the business; I call these running 
assets. Secondly, there are assets which are not normally used, but kept 
because they may be wanted. I call these (in a more general sense) 
reserve assets. (Hicks [1974] p. 46-7). 
 
The running assets may be material or immaterial. They may also be financial assets. 
They have the specific property to be complementary assets, with the consequence 
that their efficiency when taken together cannot be imputed to any of them in 
isolation. The reserve assets are just in a minimal part physical assets, and more 
generally financial assets like securities or credit lines. 
Novelty, hysteresis, and growth 
	
	 19
In this light the monetary analysis focuses on the co-ordination needed by the 
realization of irreversible investments. The monetary policy should then be aimed at 
influencing investment decisions of this kind rather than inflation rates. Its efficiency 
depends on the capacity of affecting the liquidity of the firms. 
This analytical perspective follows a tradition that goes from Smith to Keynes  
Enabling agents to cope with the passage of time and uncertainty about 
the future are central functions of the monetary system. Different 
agents have different attitudes towards risk, different capacities for 
assessing it, for valuing it, and so on, and because it is the monetary 
system that co-ordinates those agents’ activities, it is also through its 
workings that they seek to overcome what Keynes called “the dark 
forces of time and ignorance” in whatever ways they deem best for 
themselves. Today's monetary system provides myriad possibilities, 
direct and indirect, for linking consumers with producers, savers with 
investors, and for coordinating their plans, and it is continuously 
evolving new means of dealing with these matters. (Laidler[2010] p. 5) 
 
There cannot be a co-ordination brought about by the automatic and instantaneous 
interaction of the forces of supply and demand without a monetary intermediation.  
The "as if" auctioneer-supervised "market" whose mechanisms co-
ordinate these model economies is thus a metaphor for the actual 
economy's monetary system and, because its mechanisms are presumed 
always to work, these models can neither help us understand why real 
world monetary systems sometimes breakdown, or what might then 
happen as a consequence. Or to return to, and extend, Smith's much 
more famous metaphor, the invisible hand that guides the market 
economy has monetary fingers, and when these fail to function 
properly, so does the market economy. (Laidler[2010] p. 6). 
 
Keeping the economy within a stability corridor depends on the agents’ behaviours 
and the monetary policy. The existence of financial stocks acting as buffers helps 
much to the task (Leijonhufvud [1973]). Once again, the sequence of decisions and 
constraints is what matters. 
SHORT AND LONG TERM 
Mainstream economic theory maintains that the assumed proprieties of the long term 
determine what happens in the short term. Rational expectations, that is, the perfect 
knowledge of the functioning of the economy, univocally determine the current 
choices. The possible mistakes of the short term are imputed to the action of ‘wrong’ 
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institutions that must be modified. Re-establishing the ‘right’ rules and the ‘right’ 
practices, both monetary and budgetary, allows to get back in tune with the believed 
optimal long term.  The actual taking place of the  events is not relevant. It is then no 
use criticizing a budget austerity resulting in a fall in output and employment because 
there is the faith that all problems will be solved and the growth will come back. 
The consideration of novelty and the hysteresis, on the contrary and apparently 
paradoxically, hints at the prevailing role of the short term, not because one should 
forget about the long term but because this will just be the result of the sequence of 
successive short terms. 
The long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we 
are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in 
tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is past 
the ocean is flat again. (Keynes [1923] p. 65). 
 
In this light the business fluctuations appear as the natural way of being of the growth 
process, which implies the necessity to control their amplitude to make the growth 
itself viable. 
Policies, institutional rules, and organisational capabilities are essential in the 
determination of the sequence of events both in the short term and in the long term. 
However, any tentative of applying simple rules has failed both to prevent and to 
solve an economic crisis. That was the case with the fine-tuning as promoted by 
standard Keynesianism in the sixties as well as with a policy strategy reduced to target 
a low or zero inflation rate during the two last decades. 
Policies cannot be but discretionary. This means that, e.g., inflation pressures or trade 
deficits should be accepted if not promoted, when innovative choices create a divorce 
between costs and proceeds, between supply and demand. Public deficit and public 
debt should be accepted if not promoted, when the private sector has to be 
deleveraged. Institutional rules or structural policies should be aimed at creating 
viability conditions of an out-of-equilibrium process, which, without any doubt, 
require maintaining some rigidity in the reactions to market disequilibria, that is, some 
market imperfections. 
INTERPRETING SOME SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC EVENTS 
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 The explicit consideration of essential evolutionary phenomena like novelty and 
hysteresis changes significantly the interpretation of the behaviour of economies 
undergoing processes of change and the figuring out of the policies suited to deal with 
the problems involved.  
Let us briefly recall the main points of contrast between the standard equilibrium 
analytical approach, which abstracts essentially from the above phenomena, and the 
one stressed in this paper. The first and most important point concerns the method of 
contemporaneous causality, not suited to deal with qualitative processes implying 
structural changes. These processes call for an out-of-equilibrium step-by-step 
analysis of sequences of events, which require the coordination of their articulation 
over time. In this perspective, we have just seen, the long term no longer determines 
what happens in the short term, but is itself the result of a sequence of successive 
short terms.  
This has relevant implications both for production and consumption theory. As 
regards in particular production it blurs the production function atemporal 
representation of production processes, based on the hypothesis of a coordination 
imposed by assumption, and calls for a sequential articulation of the production 
process, with particular focus on the required complementarity over time of the 
phases of construction and utilization of productive capacity. 
Another important difference is the way we look at money. It plays an essential role 
for assuring the required coordination and hence the viability of the process of 
economic change. It may affect this process one-way or the other, but is never neutral 
and must be always be taken into account. 
The above considerations help a clearer understanding of some important episodes of 
contemporaneous economic history. The periods considered are characterized by 
crises and structural changes, and it is exactly when important disturbances affect the 
functioning of the economies that the relevant features of their behaviour come to the 
surface and hence the right interpretations of the phenomena taking place, with the 
adequate policy implications, can be formulated.  
The Great Depression and the Reconstruction after World War II, in particular, are 
examples of a failure and a success, respectively, of the policies implemented as a 
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result of different interpretations of the ongoing processes due to different analytical 
perspectives. 
The Great Depression 
The crisis of the 29th and the Great Depression following it appear as the result of 
disequilibria amplified by the economic policy followed: aimed, according to the 
dominating doctrine of the time, at maintaining an impossible neutrality of the 
government and characterized by a wrong appreciation of the effects of the monetary 
policy implemented. The volatility of investments, not well co-ordinated by the 
markets, was actually the main factor of the crisis. Heavy investments and abnormally 
high yields until 1928 were in fact followed by a sudden reduction of investments 
after that date, due to the unexpected reserve of lenders accustomed to uncommon 
revenues, and then by a similar attitude of borrowers worried by the perspective of 
falling prices. Excessive investments, then, made possible by easy borrowing 
facilitated by the abundance of capitals accruing to financial markets, are at the root 
of the problem. The policies pursued to deal with the problem itself, tight monetary 
conditions and falling public expenses, failed re-establishing the equilibrium of the 
economy and contributed instead bringing about an overall demand deficiency. The 
irreversibility of the distortions created could have not in fact been taken care by the 
simple market forces. Public intervention of a Keynesian type, as we know, was later 
able to alleviate the demand deficiency and to bring about a certain recovery, but not 
to re-establish a solid and stable growth process, as it didn’t deal with the structural 
factors that caused the existing disequilibria but just with the resulting disequilibria 
themselves.  
The Recovery after World War II 
The problem to be faced by the Western economies after the end of World War II is 
different from the one that characterized the Great Depression: the reconstruction of a 
productive capacity shattered by the war rather than the injection of a demand 
required to bring back to life an existing idle capacity (Hicks [1947]).  The clear 
perception of the causes of the disequilibria involved and of the time required to treat 
them properly accounts for the success of the reconstruction process carried on in the 
50’s. The focus on the time dimension of production processes, namely, the length of 
the phase of construction of productive capacity and its necessary completion before 
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its possible utilization, helps understanding the problems involved and the policy 
suited to deal properly with them. 
After the war the capital equipment had suffered from heavy destruction. Moreover, 
its being starved of labour for years had contributed to greatly run it down. As a 
consequence the current production of consumption good was not sufficient to satisfy 
the existing domestic demand. As a matter of fact the additional supplies of labour 
made possible by the demobilization of the soldiers could not produce a significant 
addition to the supply of consumption goods at once, due both to the low productivity 
of a scarce capital equipment and the construction time required to increase it.  
The potential demand fed by the wages of the newly employed labour had therefore to 
be kept down if inflation were not to develop affecting the reconstruction process. 
However, in this situation a rigid monetary policy to control the inflationary 
pressures, according to the standard doctrine, would have not been appropriate, as it 
would have put a brake on the resources hardly needed to finance the investments 
required by the ‘construction’ of capital and intermediate goods. 
Rationing and taxes are the other ways in which the necessary restriction of 
consumption expenditure could be brought about. And, again, a (moderate) rise in the 
prices of consumption goods relatively to the wage-level. This latter measure, if 
people expect a future fall in prices as the result of the increases in productivity due to 
the completion of the ongoing investment processes, would on the other hand have the 
additional advantage of making investments with shorter construction periods, badly 
needed in the first reconstruction phases, more profitable than investments with longer 
construction periods, whose final output would fetch lower prices.  
In open economies a powerful measure can be added: the imports of consumption 
goods, especially if not too costly, in order to dampen the inflationary pressure; but 
also and mainly imports of investments goods that allows reducing the time to build 
the new productive capacity, that is, “the length of time for which intense strain may 
be expected to continue” (Hicks [1947] p.  162). Thus the trade deficit appears as a 
necessary evil, and even a condition for removing it later on. 
This is the gamut of policies that have been actually implemented, inspired by the 
principle of dealing with disequilibria interacting over time rather than aiming at an 
equilibrium growth path, and that have made a success of the reconstruction effort, 
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thanks in particular to a wise monetary policy and to the help of the well-known 
Marshall Plan and of an adequate trade policy.  
The Years of High Inflation and after 
According to the interpretation of the Keynesian doctrine which was the mainstream 
in the 60’s (that is, the neo-classical synthesis), fluctuations are mainly due to changes 
that affect the global demand, and take place around a trend determined by 
technologies and preferences, i.e. by supply conditions. Macroeconomic policy is then 
reduced to an arbitrage between inflation and unemployment, the so-called fine-
tuning, aimed at fostering or checking global activity by means of the budgetary 
weapon. In this light the short term is dissociated from the long term and Keynesian 
ideas go along with neoclassical ones. This policy has failed when the economies had 
to deal with a supply shock, like the huge increase of the price of oil and other 
primary resources in the beginning of the 70’s; the economists were then confronted 
with a new theoretical challenge, the stagflation: that is, how explaining why inflation 
and unemployment increased simultaneously. According to the prevailing 
macroeconomics, inflation is a monetary phenomenon due to the expectations of 
rising prices and resulting from inappropriate government interventions, while 
unemployment is a medium-term real phenomenon, in the sense that it cannot deviate 
permanently from a natural rate, the higher the greater the market power of producers 
and/or workers. Any attempt to reduce unemployment below this natural level would 
feed inflationary pressures that would quickly grow out of control due to the 
expectations of rising prices. Only structural reforms aimed at making labour markets 
more flexible and products markets more competitive would then allow to actually 
reduce unemployment.  
We have shown in this paper that another interpretation, focussing on a related 
sequence of the events, and hence with an interaction between short and long term 
and between monetary and real forces, is more adequate when dealing with important 
economic changes. 
 As a matter of fact, the supply shock (that followed a fiscal and monetary shock in 
the U.S.) was a novelty that generated a creative destruction process, the first 
consequence of which was a greater dispersion of excesses of demand and supply 
across markets. Consumption was no longer in harmony with investment, inducing 
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sector discrepancies: and transmuting the capital embodied in the late stages of old 
processes into capital embodied in the early stage of new processes was bound to be a 
strain. If we add the fact that downward adjustments of wages in excess supply 
markets are slower than upward adjustments in excess demand markets, stagflation 
was inevitable.  
This resulting situation could neither be taken care by stimulating final demand, nor 
by applying a tight monetary policy, the tools suggested by the mainstream theory. In 
presence of a resource constraint, accommodating fiscal and monetary policy brought 
about an increase in wages rates, final demand, and prices at the detriment of 
investment, which resulted in the aggravation of inflation and unemployment. This 
reflects a mistake in interpreting the crisis as a problem of lack of demand, along a 
Keynesian line that considers consumption and investment on a par, rather than as a 
problem of insufficient accumulation of capital. Only an increase in investment 
associated with a stable money supply and only moderately flexible prices and wages 
would have brought about a re-absorption of unemployment as the result of the 
successful adoption of new and more productive technologies. 
But, as a high inflation prevailed for many years, policy makers had no other choice 
than fighting it by strongly increasing the interest rates. This policy was successful in 
the U.S., in bringing about, very rapidly, a lower rate of inflation, and because an 
acceleration of the process of accumulation of capital was made possible. Just the 
opposite of what happened in the main European countries, where a restrictive 
monetary policy during too long a time has had perverse effects on growth (reduced) 
and unemployment (augmented) with the result of constraining more and more 
productive investment. 
The return of financial crises: the emblematic case of Argentina 
The focus on an equilibrium long term believed substantially immune from current 
perturbation, a pillar of the dominating theoretical and policy approach, also helps to 
understand the financial crises that have hit Asiatic and South American economies in 
the past and seem to be coming back to day, e.g., in Argentina. The macroeconomic 
restrictions imposed to face the current difficulties have in fact negatively affected the 
long-term performance of the economies concerned rather than appearing, as 
expected, the natural complement of the structural reforms required to overcome the 
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crises and the guarantees of the expected results (Krugman [1999]. 
The experience of Argentine, an economy characterized by important structural 
shocks and frequent changes in the policies pursued, allows to stress this point.  
After the hyperinflation of the end of the 80’s strict monetary rules rather than 
discretionary behaviours have been introduced to stabilize prices expectations. A 
monetary system based on a fix rate of exchange of the peso with the U.S. dollar has 
been associated with a liberalization of the external trade. This has actually slowed 
down inflation and increased both domestic credit and the inflow of foreign capitals, 
with the result of an initial increase of both consumption and investments. However, 
things have quickly changed. The fixed rate of exchange has penalized exports, and, 
together with increasing interest rates in the U.S., fostered a massive outflow of 
capitals, thus leading to an increasing external deficit. This is a pattern that recurrently 
affects Argentina, casting doubts on the solvability of debtors and the expected state 
of the economy. The standard policies based on fixed rules may temporarily help but 
the severe restrictions involved inevitably lead to a collapse of the economy when the 
engagements taken can no longer be maintained, while they have fed final 
consumption and non-productive investments. This renders the economy potentially 
unstable and explains the recurrent crises. 
The ongoing crisis 
The crisis officially started in 2008 and still ongoing is a clear confirmation of the 
analytical and policy relevance of all the points raised in this paper: the importance of 
the specific institutional contexts where the events take place, the sequential causality 
of the events themselves, the hysteresis of production and consumption processes, the 
interaction of real and monetary phenomena. 
We know enough now not to attribute the origin of the crisis simply to the financial 
sector, and hence calling just for new kinds of regulation of the banking and the 
financial systems, as it was believed at the beginning. A deeper scrutiny allows to see 
it as the result of a perverse relation that has its roots in the real economy: namely, in 
the strong increase in incomes inequality that, following fiscal, deregulation and 
privatization policies, has been taking place in the Western world in the last thirty 
years or so (Amendola, Gaffard and Patriarca  [2013]).  
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This increase in incomes inequality, with the resulting negative effect on final 
demand, has stirred a process of interacting disequilibria over time, continuously 
widening the original inequality. 
In particular the redistribution in favour of the higher incomes has brought about an 
excess of savings that, rather than financing investments in production technologies, 
whose prospects and opportunities had been reduced by the all around aggregate 
demand deficiency, have fed an increasing demand of assets and commodities that 
can be considered, and exchanged, as stores of value (like residential houses, real 
estates, art objects, precious materials, oil, and so forth) and of financial speculative 
assets, made more and more attractive by the resulting increase in their prices.  
On the other hand, the hysteresis effects on consumption and credit facilities provided 
to sustain in particular the housing sector have slowed down the negative effects on 
final demand of the corresponding decrease in the average incomes. However, the 
option of indebtedness, although alleviating the effects of the crisis in the short run, 
has had a permanent negative effect due to the implicit further redistribution of 
incomes represented by the interest to be paid on the debts, the stronger the higher the 
interest rate. An out-of-equilibrium process has then been taking place, whose path-
dependence depends on the emergence of involuntary stocks, both real and financial 
(including unsustainable leverage), which allows fossilizing and transmitting the 
economic disequilibria over the successive steps of the process itself. Transforming 
the private indebtedness into a public indebtedness to avoid the collapse of the 
economy has just added other dimensions to the crisis, as is well known, but likewise 
not been able to deal with its roots. 
The policies followed to deal with the resulting stagnation of the economies and the 
increasing levels of unemployment, in a context characterized by a self-feeding 
process of increasing incomes inequality and a continuous shrinking of final demand, 
and where deflation rather than inflationary pressures appears as the main problem to 
be faced, have proved to be not adequate to deal with these problems, but rather have 
the opposite effect of feeding their perpetuation and in some cases rendering the crisis 
more acute.  
These policies, and the structural reforms advocated, have in particular been aimed at 
correcting supposed financially unwise behaviours by cutting expenses, raising taxes 
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and imposing balanced budgets, with the focus on a long term where the expected 
results are automatically associated with the measures taken and the incentives 
provided.  This conviction, reflecting the hypothesis of contemporaneous causality of 
the equilibrium analytical approach, abstracts from the consideration that the 
processes of economic change are characterized by an out-of-equilibrium sequence of 
interacting short terms where the costs of the decision taken come necessary before 
their expected results, and that for the ones to actually get to the others one must 
necessarily go through a process that has to be made viable under the threat of a 
collapse of the whole process.  
This is the reason why, especially in the experience of the majority of the countries of 
the euro area, the ‘austerity’ policy pursued has not brought about the growth 
supposedly associated with the latter but has fed a disequilibrium process leading to 
ever more austerity, stagnation and unemployment.  
A certain relaxing of the austerity that seems to be the consequence of the perception 
gradually gaining consensus that things are not after all going as expected, is certainly 
to be welcome, but it would take care of the effects of the crisis, the deficiency of 
demand and its leading to deflation, but not of its cause, the increasing inequality of 
incomes. In the same way as Keynesian policies, as already stressed, did bring about a 
certain recovery, but could not re-establish a solid and stable growth process, as didn’t 
actually deal with the structural factors that caused the existing disequilibria.  
The sequence of wrong or insufficient steps taken: first the focus only on the banking 
and the financial system on the wrong assumption of its self containedness, then the 
acceptance of the relation between the financial sector and the real economy but the 
interpretation of its character in a long term equilibrium perspective, and finally 
focussing on the right problem but just scratching its surface, all reflect a way of 
doing theory that abstracts from essential evolutionary problems like novelty and 
hysteresis that are instead at the heart of the processes of economic change.. 
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